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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS - TESTS DETERMINING WHAT LAW
GOVERNS A CONTRACT
Employers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Aresty,
11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S. 2d 711 (1960)
Plaintiff, a New York insurance company, issued an automobile in-
surance policy to defendant, a resident of New York. When defendant
moved to Connecticut, plaintiff issued an endorsement to the policy
changing the insured's residence, and at the same time returning part of
the premium, due to the lower Connecticut rates. While operating the
vehicle in Connecticut, defendant was involved in an accident. Defend-
ant's wife, a passenger in his car, instituted suit against defendant and the
driver of the other vehicle, whereupon defendant forwarded the process
to plaintiff to defend the action on his behalf. Since under New York
law the policy did not, afford coverage for the claim asserted by the
wife,' plaintiff in Employers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Aresty
sought a declaratory judgment asserting that New York law rather than
Connecticut law governed the insurance contract.
A majority of the court, applying the traditional conflict of laws
rule that the interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by
the law of the place where the contract is made unless the parties enter-
tain a different intention, found for the plaintiff.' The majority held
that New York law applied in interpreting this contract since the en-
dorsement changing the insured's residence did not indicate a different
intention.4
In a dissenting opinion, the method by which New York law was
applied was severely criticized. Arguing that Connecticut's interest in
the outcome of the wife's suit was more directly affected than New
York's, the dissenting opinion, favoring the defendant, applied Connecti-
1. "No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because
of death or of injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property
of his or her spouse unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the
policy." N.Y. INsURANCE LAw § 167-3.
2. 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1960).
3. Ibid.
4. An endorsement attached to an insurance policy must be read together with the policy,
and in such case the endorsement does not abbrogate any provision of the policy unless so
stated in the endorsement. Thompson-Starrett Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Co., 276 N.Y.
266, 11 N.E.2d 905 (1937). N.Y. INsuRANrcE LAW § 167-3 has been held to be incorporated
into every policy of auto liability insurance issued in New York, and this section is applicable
regardless of where the accident occared, unless the parties specifically reject it. New Am-
sterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 App. Div. 2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1956). However, this
case involved a New York resident and was held not applicable to the facts in the reported
case. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 334, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711,
715 (1960). Further, in Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573,
116 A.2d 169 (1955), the Connecticut court in construing this section applied it only to
accidents occuring in New York.
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cut law in interpreting the contract.5 Citing precedent in recent New
York cases for using this "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
test,6 the dissenting judges felt that the application of the law of the place
having the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute would
bring about the most equitable result.
Historically, three rules have combined to determine the law govern-
ing the existence of a contract. As to all matters relating to the validity,
execution, and interpretation of a contract, the law applied is the law of
the place where the last act necessary to complete the contract was per-
formed.7 When the matter in dispute concerns anything relating to the
performance of the contract, then the law of the place where the per-
formance is to take place is controlling.' An exception to this latter rule
usually results when performance may occur in several states. Here, the
law of the place where the contract is made is generally reapplied.9
Finally, when the intent of the parties can be determined as to which
law should govern, and it is reasonable in relation to the terms of the
contract to enforce their intentions, then the intent of the parties may
be given priority over the other rules.'" All of the above rules are
subject to the contingency of a court in the state where suit is brought
determining whether a pertinent statute is substantive or procedural in
nature. If a statute of a state other than where suit is brought is pro-
cedural, then the court need not concern itself with the conflict of laws
problem, and may apply its own law. If it is substantive, then the
general rules apply in determining which state's law is applicable."
The "center of gravity" test attacks all of the traditional rules as be-
5. Employers iUab. Assur. Corp. v. Aresty, 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 336, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711,
718 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
6. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Rubin v. Irving Trust, 305 N.Y.
288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
7. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 1 App. Div. 2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1956);
Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust, 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939); Union Nat'l Bank of
Chicago v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 332 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 (3d ed. 1949).
8. Swift & Co. v. Banker's Trust, 280 N.Y. 135, 19 N.E.2d 992 (1939); Union Nat'l Bank
of Chicago v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAws § 358 (1934).
9. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc. 2d 18, 150 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup.
Ct. 1956). Another view is that the law of the place in which the specific act complained of
as a breach was performed governs, when the contract is to be performed at more than one
place. Annot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 254 (1956).
10. Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus the Restatement, 51 YALE L. J.
893 (1942); Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the Parties, 32 ILL. L
REV. 899 (1938).
11. This rule is particularly unsatisfactory because different courts have labeled the same
statute both substantive and procedural. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 167-3 was held to be sub-
stantive in New Amsterdam v. Stecker, 1 App. Div. 2d 629, 152 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1956), and
procedural in Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Conn. 573, 116 A.2d 169
(1955). See also Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 881 (1951).
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ing unrealistic. Of comparatively recent origin, 2 it has been given vary-
ing degrees of recognition in several jurisdictions.3 This doctrine leaves
the judicial determination of the applicable law to the forum which has
the greatest interest in the outcome of the litigation, but seemingly offers
no test to determine what factors will be controlling. Further, whether
this doctrine was intended to be applied uniformly in all conflict of laws
situations has apparently never been considered. 4
The primary reason given in support of the traditional views is that
they are certain and easily applicable. In reality, however, they may be
the subject of considerable confusion. To apply the law of the place
where the contract is made, it is necessary to determine the last act creat-
ing a binding contract. This may often be difficult to assess. Further,
when parties live, negotiate, and perform contracts in state X, it is un-
reasonable to apply the law of State Y merely because the letter of accept-
ance, which is the last act creating the contract, was mailed from state
y.1
5
As previously discussed,' 6 it is difficult to determine what law governs
performance when the contract may be performed in more than one
place. However, even where performance is to be given in only one
place, it may be difficult to determine just where that place is.' Fur-
thermore, when the contract is silent as to where performance will occur,
this test must be abandoned altogether.'
The "intent of the parties" doctrine has undergone the strongest
criticism.'" It is limited to the law in force in one of the states with
which the transaction has a substantial connection. Nonetheless, within
limits it gives the parties the power to legislate, which often results in a
positive attempt to evade a particular law' Further, in many instances
12. First applied in Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945).
13. See Sun Ins. Co. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1959); Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson,
217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954);
Rubin v. Irving Trust, 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Jansson v. Swedish Am.
Line, 185 F.2d 212 (1st Cir. 1950).
14. Ohio, like the majority of states, has never adopted the "center of gravity test," but has
given judicial recognition to all of the traditional views. See e.g. Alropa Corp. v. Kirchwehm,
138 Ohio St. 30, 33 N.E.2d 655 (1941) (for the place of contracting rule), Pittsburgh, C.C.
& St. Louis Ry Co. v. Sheppard, 56 Ohio St. 68, 46 N.E. 61 (1897) (for the place of perfor-
mance rule), and Harrison v. Baldwin, 3 Ohio C.C. Dec. 154 (1891), aff'd, 53 Ohio St. 648,
44 NE. 1138 (1895) (for the intent of the parties rule).
15. Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REV. 143 (1936); Lorenzen and
Heilman, Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 555, 573 (1935).
16. See cases cited note 8 supra.
17. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 163, 124 NE.2d 99, 103 (1954); GOODRIC-H, CON-
FLICr OF LAws § 110 (3d ed. 1949).
18. Rittersbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950); Thompson v. Lake-
wood City Dev. Co., 105 Misc. 680, 174 N.Y.S. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
19. See Cook, 'Contracts and Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV.
899 (1938).
20. Ibid.
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where "intent of the parties" has been used, it is fair to say that the
parties never had the conflict of laws question in mind at all. A recent
criticism of this theory is that actually the "intent of the parties" con-
ceals a choice made by a court in determining the law of that state having
the most intimate connection with the problem - the identical formula
used in applying the "center of gravity" test."
The "center of gravity" test, though eliminating in certain areas some
of the problems caused by the traditional views, brings with it other
problems equally disadvantageous. As stated in Auten v. Auten,"2 the
use of this approach gives control to the place having the most interest,
enables courts to give effect to the probable intention of the parties, and
provides courts with an opportunity to give consideration to the state
offering the better result. On the other hand, when contacts are evenly
balanced, parties have no way of foretelling prior to a judicial determina-
tion which law will be applied. This deprives litigants of any certainty
as to the outcome of a case. To have a trial court write the contract for
the parties is not only arbitrary, but is also likely to reverse one of the
supposed benefits of this theory - to manifest the probable intention of
the parties. The possibility of seeking the forum with the better law, and
then rationalizing the facts in order to apply the law of that state, is a
danger that courts may all too willingly assume.23
The majority and dissenting opinions in Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corporation v. Aresty24 evidence the state of the present law in
New York. Several inconsistent rules coexist, none of which overrules or
supersedes the others. In Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany,2" the willingness of New York courts to retain all of the rules was
indicated. Here, in the same opinion, the court used the place of con-
tracting, the place of performance, and the "center of gravity" tests in
arriving at its decision. However, as evidenced by the Employers Lia-
bility case, the result will not always be uniform when more than one
conflict of laws rule is used simultaneously with another, for the place-
of-contracting rule resulted in New York law being applied, while the
"center of gravity" test resulted in Connecticut law being applied. There-
fore, either the traditional rules must be entirely eliminated and the
"center of gravity" test uniformly adopted or, if all are to be retained,
21. London Assur. Co. v. Campanhia De Moagens DoBarreiro, 167 U.S. 149 (1897); Harper,
Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays,
56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947).
22. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
23. Rubin v. Irving Trust, 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Note, 3 UTAH L. REV.
490 (1953).
24. 11 App. Div. 2d 331, 205 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1960).
25. 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y.S. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
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